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REVISITING A "PROMISING INSTITUTION":
PUBLIC LAW LITIGATION IN THE CIVIL LAW
WORLD
Lesley K. McAllister*
INTRODUCTION
Group litigation has been the focus of a significant body of
comparative law literature since the 1970s. This body of work was
largely inspired by the emergence of class actions and other public
interest law in the American legal system-the new types of civil
litigation that Abram Chayes termed "public law litigation" in 1976.1
Comparative legal scholars, particularly scholars from outside the
United States, have often considered the extent to which such group
litigation can and should be transplanted into countries whose legal
systems form part of the civil law tradition.
2
Within this literature, Brazil has attracted attention as one of the
few civil law countries that has successfully incorporated and
developed a procedural mechanism for group litigation.3 The public
civil action-aqdo civil pzblica--created by statute in 1985, enables
* Associate Professor of Law, University of San Diego; Assistant Adjunct Professor, School of
International Relations and Pacific Studies, University of California San Diego. For their comments and
editorial assistance, I thank Colin Crawford, Bert Lazerow, Pierre Legrand, the participants in the
seminar "Public Law Litigation and Enforcement: Comparative Perspectives," and the members of the
Georgia State Law Review.
1. See Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281,
1284 (1976).
2. See Richard B. Cappalli & Claudio Consolo, Class Actions for Continental Europe? A
Preliminary Inquiry, 6 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 217, 223 (1992); Michael S. Greve, The Non-
Reformation of Administrative Law: Standing to Sue and Public Interest Litigation in West German
Environmental Law, 22 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 197, 207, 229-43 (1989); Per Henrik Lindblom, Individual
Litigation and Mass Justice: A Swedish Perspective and Proposal on Group Actions in Civil Procedure,
45 AM. J. COMP. L. 805, 817 (1997). "Civil law" countries include most of Western Europe, all of Central
and South America, and many parts of Asia and Africa. "Common law" countries include Great Britain, the
United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. On the origins and operation of the civil law tradition,
see generally JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADmON: AN INTRODUCION TO THE LEGAL
SYSTEMS OF WESTERN EUROPE AND LATiN AMERICA (2d ed. 1985).
3. See Antonio Gidi, Class Actions in Brazil-A Model for Civil Law Countries, 51 AM. J. COMP. L.
311, 323-25 (2003); Michele Taruffo, Some Remarks on Group Litigation in Comparative Perspective,
I I DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 405,412 (2001).
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the legal defense of environmental, consumer and other "diffuse and
collective" interests. Brazilian jurists and political scientists have
called the introduction of the public civil action a "radical
transformation" and even "a revolution" in the Brazilian legal order.
4
Referred to as the "Brazilian class action" by some, it has been held
up as a model for other civil law countries.5
However, the most interesting aspect of the public civil action in
Brazil is not the procedural instrument itself, but the legal institution
that has been key in establishing and using the public civil action to
enforce statutory and constitutional rights. This legal institution is the
Brazilian Ministgrio Pztblico or, using its French name, the Ministdre
Public-the prosecutorial institution that constitutes the civil law
tradition's analog to the Attorney General in common law countries.
6
In the late 1970s, the Italian legal comparativist Mauro Cappelletti
identified the Ministdre Public as a "promising institution" for the
legal defense of group and public interests.7 In Brazil, to a greater
extent than in other civil law countries, prosecutors have shown signs
of living up to this promise.
The public law litigation work of Brazilian prosecutors, rather than
the procedural instrument they use, is the focus of the present article. As
such, it is an exercise in comparative law scholarship of the "legal
systems" type rather than the "rule" type, as distinguished by John
8Henry Merryman. Merryman explains that while rule comparison has
been the predominant form of comparative legal scholarship, rule
comparison has "declined into a spent, static enterprise whose potential
4. Roo Rio BASTOS ARANTES, MINISTftRIO PUJBLICO E POLITICA NO BRASIL 24 (2002); EDIS
MILARt, DIEITO DO AMBIENTE 510 (2001).
5. See Gidi, supra note 3, at 326; Taruffo, supra note 3, at 412. Because of the substantial
differences between the American class action and the Brazilian public civil action, I use the literal
translation of the Brazilian term, public civil action, throughout this paper.
6. Minist~rio Pftblico can be literally translated as the Public Ministry, but it is more usefully
translated as "attorney general," "public prosecution," or "procuracy."
7. 2 ACCESS TO JUSTICE: PROMISING INSTITUTIONS (Mauro Cappelletti & John Weisner eds., 1979)
[hereinafter ACCESS TO JUSTICE, VOL. H].
8. See Pierre Legrand, John Henry Merryman and Comparative Legal Studies: A Dialogue, 47 AM.
J. COMP. L. 3 (1999); John Henry Merryman, Comparative Law Scholarship, 21 HASTINGS INT'L &
COMP. L. REv. 771, 775-77 (1998).
[Vol. 24:693
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PUBLIC LAW LITIGATION IN CIVIL LAW
for significant academic productivity is exhausted."9 He promotes an
approach to comparative law that takes as its unit of comparison not the
text of legal rules, but rather the legal institutions, actors, and other
components of the "social sub-system" that constitutes the legal
system.10 In his view, a legal systems approach will reinvigorate
comparative law studies and help it move past the stagnancy of its
traditional tasks.
In the case of group litigation in Brazil, it is not the text of the
public civil action law or the details of its judicial implementation
that represent the most significant legal innovation, but rather the
Brazilian Ministgrio Ptiblico's role in enabling and supporting its
development. The story of group litigation in Brazil is the story of
this legal institution. Using the public civil action, the Brazilian
Minist~rio Pziblico has established a novel and powerful way of
enforcing statutory and constitutional rights in the Brazilian legal
system-a notable feat in a legal system long characterized by
unequal and inadequate enforcement of the law.1 To the extent that
civil law countries look to Brazil as a model for group litigation, they
should focus their attention on the institutional innovations that
occurred rather than novelties in the text of the enabling statute.
In Part I of this article, the literature on public law litigation and
the Minist&e Public is reviewed. Part II describes the role that the
Brazilian Minist~rio Pblico has played-establishing the legal
framework, building its institutional capacity, and doing public law
litigation. The conclusion offers final remarks about the potential of
the Ministgrio Pztblico in the representation of group interests,
including a discussion of important concerns that have been raised
about having public prosecutors play this role.
9. Merryman, supra note 8, at 782.
10. See Legrand, supra note 8, at 62.
11. See Keith S. Rosenn, Brazil's Legal Culture: The Jeito Revisited, I FLA. INT'L L.J. 1, 19 (1984);
Keith S. Rosenn, The Jeito: Brazil's Institutional Bypass of the Formal Legal System and Its
Developmental Implications, 19 AM. J. COMP. L. 514, 514 (1971).
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I. PUBLIC LAW LITIGATION
In 1976, the American legal scholar Abram Chayes observed that a
new type of civil litigation had become common in the federal courts
of the United States. As this new civil litigation concerned public
policy issues that arose from the implementation and enforcement of
public laws, he called it "public law litigation." Other scholars before
and after Chayes have described this legal activity using many other
names-group litigation, public interest litigation, private attorney
general actions, and policy-oriented litigation. 12  Although their
definitional contours vary, each of these terms expresses the idea that
civil lawsuits are being used in a new way to benefit the condition of
groups within society or society as a whole.
While Chayes and other scholars described this new type of
litigation in the United States, foreign scholars analyzed the need for
group litigation in their legal systems. In particular, Mauro
Cappelletti, an Italian comparativist, researched and wrote
extensively about how European countries with civil law systems
might enable the legal defense of group interests, which he viewed as
an essential aspect of "access to justice" in a modem society. 3 The
basic question that motivated his research was whether and how the
legal systems of civil law countries might be made available for
enforcement of social rights in the way that United States courts were
12. See OWEN M. FISS, THE CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNCTION (1978); DONALD L. HOROWITZ, THE COURTS
AND SOCIAL POLICY (1977); STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, FROM MEDIEVAL GROUP LITIGATION TO THE
MODERN CLASS ACTION (1987); Mauro Cappelletti & Bryant Garth, Finding an Appropriate
Compromise: A Comparitive Study of Individualistic Models and Group Rights in Civil Procedure, 2
CIV. JUST. Q. 111 (1983); John C. Coffee, Jr., Rescuing the Private Attorney General: Why the Model of
the Lawyer as Bounty Hunter Is Not Working, 42 MD. L. REV. 215 (1983); Robert L. Rabin, Lawyers for
Social Change: Perspectives on Public Interest Law, 28 STAN. L. REV. 207 (1976); Taruffo, supra note
3.
13. See, e.g., I ACCESS TO JUSTICE: A WORLD SURVEY (Mauro Cappelletti & Bryant Garth eds.,
1978) [hereinafter ACCESS TO JUSTICE, VOL. 1]; ACCESS TO JUSTICE, VOL. IL supra note 7; 3 ACCESS TO
JUSTICE: EMERGING ISSUES AND PERSPECTIVES (Mauro Cappelletti & Bryant Garth eds., 1979)
[hereinafter ACCESS TO JUSTICE, VOL. III]; 4 ACCESS TO JUSTICE: ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN AN
ANTHROPOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE (Klaus-Friedrich Koch ed., 1979). Cappelletti and his coauthors in the
Florence Access to Justice Project conducted "a worldwide survey" of access to justice. Funded by the
Ford Foundation and the Italian National Research Council beginning in 1973, the Florence Access to Justice
Project culminated in the publication of four volumes comprised by fifty-five articles in 1978 and 1979.
[Vol. 24:693
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PUBLIC LAW LITIGATION IN CIVIL LAW
in the 1960s and 1970s. This section reviews the literature on public
law litigation that developed in the United States as well as the
literature concerned with enabling group litigation in other countries,
particularly civil law countries.
A. Public Law Litigation in the United States
While other scholars had written about the phenomenon of public
interest litigation, Chayes was the first to identify it as a "new model
of civil litigation" and describe its essential characteristics in a way
that analytically distinguished it from traditional civil litigation.
14
Rather than a dispute between private parties about individual rights,
the new type of litigation involved "a grievance about the content or
conduct of policy."'15 Chayes observed that the interests of groups
rather than individuals formed the basis of the legal complaint and
that the type of relief was often "corrective rather than
compensatory."' 6 He highlighted the role of the judge, who often
fashioned the remedy through a process of negotiation and remained
involved in supervising the implementation of the remedy.
Public law litigation constitutes a subset of what others have
referred to as group actions or group litigation. Michele Taruffo
makes a useful distinction between two categories of group litigation
based on their remedial objective. 17 The first category, damage-
oriented group litigation, seeks compensation for the individuals in
the group for the harms or injuries suffered. The second category,
policy-oriented group litigation, is aimed at achieving some sort of
legal change, usually a change in regulatory policy or legally relevant
14. See Chayes, supra note 1; Abram Chayes, Foreword: Public Law Litigation and the Burger
Court, 96 HARv. L. REv. 4 (1982) [hereinafter Chayes, Burger Court].
15. Chayes, Burger Court, supra note 14, at 5.
16. Id.; see also Chayes, supra note 1, at 1288-1302.
17. See Taruffo, supra note 3, at 406-08; cf Cappelletti & Garth, supra note 12, at 121-40 (offering
an alternative way to divide group actions into four types based on the type of plaintiff: parens patriae
suits brought by the government; actions brought by civil society organizations; actions brought by
administrative agencies, and private actions brought as class actions); Mauro Cappelletti, Governmental
and Private Advocates for the Public Interest in Civil Litigation: A Comparative Study, in ACCESS TO
JUSTICE, VOL. II, supra note 7, at 773 (offering the categories of "public (governmental) attorney
general," individual "private attorney general," and organizational "private attorney general").
20081
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behavior. Taruffo's policy-oriented group litigation encompasses
Chayes's public law litigation. Public law litigation can also be
considered a subset of public interest law, a vague term which has
been used widely to encompass any legal activity that purports to
seek social change. The present article adopts the term public law
litigation because of its more delimited and defined character as well
as its significant parallel with the new type of litigation that has
emerged in Brazil as described in Part II.
The set of cases that Chayes described concerned school
desegregation, employment discrimination, prisoners' rights,
securities fraud, and other significant public policy issues. Chayes
suggested that such cases arose from the emergence of the modem
administrative state. 18 The decisions and actions of administrative
agencies affected large groups of people who, in turn, called upon the
courts to exercise legal oversight. Previously viewed as neutral
arbiters in private disputes, courts were now being asked "to deal
with grievances over the administration of some public or quasi-
public program and to vindicate the public policies embodied in the
governing statutes or constitutional provisions." 19 Unsurprisingly,
judicial decisions in such cases had broad public policy implications
and thus transformed the American judiciary into a more political
actor. As stated by Chayes, "[1]itigation inevitably becomes an
explicitly political forum and the court a visible arm of the political
process." 20 While judicial intervention in political issues has been
criticized on the grounds of both illegitimacy and inefficacy, public
law litigation continues to be prevalent in the United States. 2 1
18. See Chayes, Burger Court, supra note 14, at 60.
19. Id. at4.
20. Chayes, supra note 1, at 1304.
21. See Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Destabilization Rights: How Public Law Litigation
Succeeds, 117 HARv. L. REv. 1015, 1017-19 (2004).
[Vol. 24:693
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B. The Minist~re Public: A "Promising Institution" in the Civil Law
World
Similar to Chayes, Cappelletti theorized that a new set of group
interests had emerged with the rise of modem society.22 He viewed
society as having undergone a process of "massification" with the
"massive organization of labor," a "mass psychology molded by
modem mass media," and "the rise of the mass-oriented 'welfare
state.' 23 In the new mass society, rights became increasingly
"diffuse and collective."24 These were rights that were held by many
people at once-by associations, communities, and classes of
people.2 5 According to Cappelletti, such rights included "freedom
from indigency, ignorance, and discrimination, as well as the right to
a healthy environment, to social security, and to protection from
massive financial, commercial, corporate, or even governmental
oppressions and frauds."
26
Cappelletti viewed the American legal system as the most
advanced in terms of its legal protection for this new set of social
27
rights. He saw this legal development, however, not as unique to the
United States, but rather as a trend in all legal systems: a necessary
adaptation of legal systems to the new mass society. The legal
protection of diffuse interests formed the second wave of what
Cappelletti called the "three waves" of access to justice in the
worldwide access-to-justice movement.28 The first was the provision
22. See Mauro Cappelletti & Bryant Garth, Access to Justice: The Worldwide Movement to Make
Rights Effective-A General Report, in ACCESS TO JUSTICE, VOL. I, supra note 13, at 35-36 (making
note of Chayes's work, referring to the "worldwide movement in the direction of what Professor Chayes
has called 'public law' litigation").
23. Mauro Cappelletti, Vindicating the Public Interest Through the Courts: A Comparativist's
Contribution, in ACCESS TO JUSTICE, VOL. IIL supra note 13, at 517-18; see Cappelletti & Garth, supra
note 22, at 35-36, 49.
24. See infra note 51 (explaining the different meanings of these terms in Brazil). Following the "access
to justice" literature, I will refer to both hereinafter simply as diffuse rights or interests.
25. See Cappelletti, supra note 23, at 518.
26. Id. at 519.
27. Seeid. at516.
28. See Cappelletti & Garth, supra note 22, at 6 (defining access to justice as having both a
procedural and a substantive dimension: "[flirst, the system must be equally accessible to all, and
20081
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of legal aid to the poor; the second was the representation of
collective or diffuse interests other than those of the poor, particularly
the interests of consumers and environmentalists; and the third wave
involves the creation of alternative dispute processing procedures and
institutions that are more specialized and less formal that traditional
courts.29 He based his model largely on the United States, which
experienced significant legal developments in each of these areas
beginning in the 1960s.
Cappelletti was interested in how countries in the civil law
tradition might extend legal protection to this new set of social rights.
He found that the Ministmre Public3° -the analog to the Attorney
General in common law countries 3 1-had certain characteristics that
might enable it to play a role in the legal defense of group interests.
He observed that the prosecutors that formed part of the Minist&e
Public in civil law countries were traditionally responsible not just
for prosecuting crimes, but also for representing the ordre public, or
"public interest," in litigation involving private individuals. 32
The first of the traditional roles of the Minist&e Public was to
prosecute criminal cases, preparing and presenting the state's case
against the accused in court. The second traditional role was to
intervene in ordinary judicial proceedings between private
individuals to ensure the representation of the "interests... of society
second, it must lead to results that are individually and socially just."). They state that their work has
emphasized the procedural dimension. Id.
29. See Cappelletti & Garth, supra note 22, at 35-36, 49.
30. This discussion of the "access to justice" literature follows Cappelletti in his use of the French version
of the institution's name, the "Minist re public."
31. See John Bilyeu Oakley, The United States as Participant in Public Law Litigation: Recent
Developments, 13 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 247 (1980) (discussing the potential role of the United States
Attorney General in public law litigation).
32. See generally Vincenzo Vigoriti, The Role of the "'Ministire Public" in Civil Proceedings: Italy,
in ITALIAN NATIONAL REPORTS TO THE IXTH INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF COMPARATIVE LAW,
TEHRAN 269-88 (1974), as reprinted in COMPARATIVE LAW: WESTERN EUROPEAN AND LATIN
AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEMS 501-07 (John Henry Merryman & David S. Clark eds., 1978); Burton A.
Weisbrod, Joel F. Handler & Neil K. Komesar, PUBLIC INTEREST LAW: AN ECONOMIC AND
INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS (1978). The Minist&e Public has traditionally had wide discretion in
determining what constituted the public interest, and has tended to be conservative in its determination.
[Vol. 24:693
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PUBLIC LAW LITIGATION IN CIVIL LAW
and of the law." 33 Most commonly, prosecutors intervened in private
litigation that involved weak individual parties such as "minors,
widows, absentees, and incompetents," often in cases involving
marital and paternity disputes.34 As explained by Merryman, the
theory behind this "public interest" function was that parties could
not be expected to present all arguments in a given dispute and, thus,
the representative of the Ministbre Public was necessary "to assure
that an impartial view, in the interest of the law, is presented.
35
Cappelletti argued that this traditional public interest role should be
extended to include the new set of public interests that had emerged
in the massification of society.
36
Cappelletti saw signs of this potential in the historical development
of the institution in European countries. In several countries,
particularly Belgium, France, and Italy, the Ministdre Public had
gained the power in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries
to initiate as well as intervene in civil cases involving "ordre
public."37 The Ministbre Public's role had generally shifted over the
centuries from defending the state's interest to defending society's
interests. 38 In the process, the Ministdre Public was increasingly
dissociated from the executive branch and placed within the judicial
branch, or even made autonomous from all three branches. 39 For
these reasons, Cappelletti identified the Ministire Public as an
institution that could become active in the legal defense of the newly
emerging set of diffuse and collective interests.
33. See RENt DAVID, FRENCH LAW: ITS STRUCTURE, SOURCES, AND METHODOLOGY 59-61 (1972),
as reprinted in COMPARATIVE LAW: WESTERN EUROPEAN AND LATIN AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEMS
498-500, supra note 32; MERRYMAN, supra note 2, at 103.
34. Cappelletti, Governmental and Private Advocates, supra note 17, at 778.
35. MERRYMAN, supra note 2, at 103.
36. See Cappelletti, supra note 17, at 775.
37. See Cappelletti, supra note 23, at 526.
38. DAVID, supra note 33, at 499-500.
39. See MERRYMAN, supra note 2, at 104 (referring to the "judicialization" of the public prosecutor
service); Vigoriti, supra note 32, at 501 (stating that the Italian constitution of 1948 abolished the
institution's dependence on the executive branch and affirmed prosecutors as members of the judicial
branch); MAURICiO DUCE & CRISTIAN RIEGO, CENTRO DE ESTUDIOS DE JUSTICIA DE LAS AMtRICAS
(CEJA), DESAFiOS DEL MINISTERIO POBLICO FISCAL EN AMERICA LATINA 24-25 (2005) (identifying
the Ministirio Pblico in Argentina, Bolivia, Chiles, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras,
Nicaragua, and Venezuela as "autonomous or outside the other branches of government").
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Although he identified the Ministre Public a "promising
institution," Cappelletti ultimately concluded that it would be
ineffective in the defense of diffuse interests. In his view, prosecutors
are too much like judges in that they stand above the people, and they
are too much like executive branch officers to defend people against
"abuses by the political branches of govemment. ' 4° He also identified
obstacles in the seemingly inflexible bureaucratic structure of the
Ministbre Public, particularly its lack of specialized sections in areas
such as marketing regulations or environmental protection.41 He
concluded that the Ministbre Public was "inherently unsuited to
becoming the forceful promoter of the type of group, class, and
public-interest actions that are most important in modem societies. ' 42
II. THE BRAZILIAN MINISTARIO POBLICO AND PUBLIC LAW
LITIGATION
Despite Cappelletti's predictions, Brazil's Ministbre Public-the
Brazilian Ministirio Pztblico-is extremely active in defending group
interests. A series of changes in Brazilian law redefined the
institutional mission and profile of the Brazilian Ministdrio Pliblico
in the 1980s. Through these legal changes, the Ministgrio Pztblico
was transformed from the part of the executive branch responsible for
criminal prosecution into a more independent governmental
institution responsible for legally defending the "diffuse and
collective interests" of society as well as prosecuting crimes.43
The Ministgrio Ptiblico's work in Brazil constitutes an analog to
the public law litigation described by Chayes. The Brazilian
Ministgrio Pztblico often files legal actions that challenge public
policy decisions and that seek to restructure and change how public
laws-both statutes and the Constitution-get implemented and
40. Cappelletti, supra note 17, at 784-85.
41. Seeid. at787.
42. Id. at 785.
43. This section is based on original research that is fully presented in Chapter 3 of LESLEY K.
MCALLISTER, MAKING LAW MATTER: ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND LEGAL INSTITUTIONS IN
BRAZIL (2008).
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enforced. Prosecutors view themselves as the representatives of
societal interests, rather than governmental interests. As they often
see governmental interests to be in conflict with societal interests,
many of their lawsuits are against the government itself.
Yet, while Chayes highlighted the role of the judge in American
public law litigation, it is the role of the prosecutor that is most
significant in Brazilian public law litigation. Prosecutors play a major
role in both litigating and negotiating remedies for public law cases.
Even though civil society organizations and a number of other
governmental institutions are authorized to file public civil actions
under the Public Civil Action Law, over ninety percent of public civil
actions have been filed by prosecutors. 44
This section examines the close relationship between the Brazilian
Ministdrio Pz blico and public law litigation in Brazil. Part A shows
how the Ministdrio Ptiblico helped establish the statutory and
constitutional framework that enabled the representation of group
interests. Part B shows how the Ministgrio Pziblico restructured itself
to represent group interests. Part C shows how the Ministgrio Pliblico
has predominated in representing group interests, describing how
prosecutors develop public law litigation and their primary areas of
litigation. While most of the examples and data presented come from
the Brazilian state of S~o Paulo, the Ministgrio Ptiblico of other
Brazilian states as well as the Federal Ministgrio Pblico play a
similar role.
45
44. Silvia Cappelli, Novos Rumos do Direito Ambiental, in TEMAS DE DIREITO AMBIENTAL: UMA
VISA O INTERDISCIPLINAR 55 (Enio Costa Hausen, Orci Paulino Bretanha Teixeira & Prcio Brasil
Alvares eds., 2000).
45. The author conducted field research in 2000 and in 2001-02 in the Brazilian states of Slo Paulo,
Pard, Rio Grande do Sul, Mato Grosso, Rio de Janeiro, Amazonas, Parani, and Pernambuco. While the
Ministrio Ptiblico of all these states had cases in many if not all of the areas of public law litigation
described in this paper, the volume and significance of this work varied. Slo Paulo's Ministdrio Piblico
is the country's largest state prosecutorial institution and its most active in the defense of public interests
in terms of the number of cases handled.
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A. Building the Legal Framework
The legal framework for public law litigation in Brazil consists of
procedural law, substantive law, and constitutional law passed in the
1980s and 1990s. The procedural law set forth a mechanism for the
legal representation of group interests. The substantive laws created
new rights with a group dimension---environmental laws, consumer
laws, disability rights laws, and others. The constitutional law
established the Ministgrio PzTblico as a defender of societal interests
and granted the institution a high degree of autonomy. The Ministgrio
Ptiblico played an important role in writing the statutes and
constitutional law that expanded its legal authority to defend group
rights.
While the Ministdrio Ptiblico's institutional initiative played a
significant part in constructing this legal framework, the social and
political context of the 1980s was very favorable for an expansion of
the Ministdrio Ptiblico's role. In the 1980s, large social and political
changes were taking place as Brazil transitioned to democracy after
fifteen years of military dictatorship. The period of redemocratization
was a time for questioning the authority of the government and
exposing the ways that it had violated the rights of citizens during the
dictatorship. There was a general lack of confidence in government,
particularly in the executive branch that had dominated and subdued
the judicial and legislative branches during the military dictatorship.
Given the post-dictatorship fervor for democracy, the idea of
having the Ministrio Pblico become politically independent of the
executive branch and assume the role of defending societal rights was
well-received in the Constitutional Assembly convened to draft the
Brazilian Federal Constitution of 1988.46 As Rogdrio Bastos Arantes
points out, one of the historically "commonplace" ideas of Brazilian
46. See Fibio Josd Kerche Nunes, 0 Ministirio Ptiblico e a Constituinte de 1987/88, in 0 SISTEMA
DE JUSTI(;A 61, 69 (Maria Tereza Sadek ed., 1999). The National Constitutional Assembly (Assemblgia
Nacional Constituinte) was composed of 559 elected representatives from diverse political parties. The
work of the Assembly took almost two years and included the preparation of eight drafts as well as the
final constitutional text. There was significant public participation in the process and more than 65,000
amendments were offered. Id. at 61.
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political thought was that Brazilian society was fragile, disorganized,
and incapable of defending its fundamental rights :
4 7
[Emerging from this idea were] abundant complaints about the
artificiality of [Brazilian] political institutions, especially
representative institutions, and criticisms that [the Brazilian]
tradition lacked mechanisms to enforce laws and the constitution.
At times, this point of departure led to a desire for a neutral
power, external to the world of politics and with sufficient
autonomy to protect and lead society.48
In the period of democratization, the Minist rio Ptiblico's long-
held institutional interest of increasing its autonomy from the
executive branch dovetailed with its interest in taking a leading role
in the protection of the new set of emergent diffuse and collective
rights.49 With capable leadership and strong organization, the
Ministdrio Ptblico was able to take a leading role in "one of the most
radical transformations in Brazilian law-the introduction of
collective and diffuse rights into the legal order."
50
47. See ARANTES, supra note 4, at 129.
48. Id.
49. See id. at 21. There are several studies by Brazilian scholars on the Ministgrio Ptiblico's
institutional reconstruction in the 1980s. In a study of the historical evolution of the Ministirio Ptiblico
in Brazil, Arantes shows that its institutional reconstruction was the result of a series of changes that
were intentionally pursued by the members of the institution. To the extent that the institutional
reconstruction depended on legislative changes, he shows that the legal changes were suggested and
lobbied for by the institution itself. Id. at 22. He explains that in the 1970s, even before the country's
redemocratization, the Ministirio Piblico began to define a new role for the institution in defending
societal rather than governmental interests. See generally MARIA TEREZA SADEK, 0 MINISTERIO
PUBLICO E A JUSTI(A NO BRASIL (1997); ELA WiECKO V. DE CASTILHO & MARIA TEREZA SADEK, 0
MINISTtRIO PUBLICO FEDERAL E A ADMiNISTRA(.AO DA JUSTICA NO BRASIL (1998); CATIA AIDA
SILVA, JUSTICA EM JoGo: NOVAS FACETAS DA ATUACAO DOS PROMOTORES DA JUSTICA (2001); Nunes,
supra note 46; Maria de Gloria Bonelli, Minist6rio Pfiblico Paulista: Construglo Institucional e
Identidade Profissional (2001) (unpublished manuscript, Slo Paulo) (on file with author). This section
draws from the work of these scholars in addition to data collected in my own research to explain the
institutional transformation.
50. ARANTES, supra note 4, at 24.
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1. Procedural Law: The Public Civil Action Law
The Public Civil Action Law (Lei de Aqdo Civil Pziblica) of 1985
authorized the Ministgrio Pztblico, as well as other governmental
entities and civil society organizations, to file public civil actions
(aqdo civil pzblica) to impose civil liability for harms caused to the
public interest. The 1985 law authorized public civil actions in the
areas of harms to the environment, consumers, and cultural
patrimony. The 1988 Constitution and the Consumer Defense Code
of 1990 extended this new instrument to also cover all "other diffuse
and collective interests." 51 Sometimes referred to as the "law of
diffuse interests," the Public Civil Action Law is the primary
procedural vehicle for public law litigation in Brazil.
Before the passage of the Public Civil Action Law, the Ministirio
Ptiblico had already begun litigating on behalf of group interests in
the environmental area. The 1981 National Environmental Policy Act
(Lei da Politica Nacional do Meio Ambiente) authorized the
Ministgrio Ptiblico to initiate civil litigation on behalf of
environmental interests. The law states, in relevant part, "the Federal
and the State Minist6rio Pblico may bring civil and criminal liability
actions for damages caused to the environment." 52 Paulo Affonso
Leme Machado, a Sdo Paulo prosecutor who many years later
51. See Consumer Defense Code [Cddigo de Defesa do Consumidor] Art. 81, Law no. 8,078 (Braz.). In
Brazil, the term "diffuse and collective interests" (interesses difusos e coletivos) is preferred to "public
interest" in referring to those interests commonly grouped together as the public interest in the American
legal context. Traditionally, "public interest" (interesse ptiblico) has been used in Brazil to refer to
interests of the state or government. Diffuse interests (interesses difusos), in contrast, are those of society
as a whole, defined in Brazilian law as interests that are transindividual, indivisible by nature, and held by an
indeterminate number of people linked by a factual situation. The interest in conserving forests and many
other environmental interests are examples of diffuse interests. Collective interests (interesses coletivos) are
transindividual, indivisible interests held by a determinable number of people who are part of a particular
group, class or category that are united through a basic legal relationship. An example would be the
protection of the lands of a certain indigenous group. Brazilian law further distinguishes "homogenous
individual interests" (interresses individuais homogdneos) which refers to collective interests that are
divisible-such as the recovery of damages by purchasers of an automobile with a manufacturing defect.
It is also important to note that the term "diffuse and collective interests" is used interchangeably with
"diffuse and collective rights" (direitos difusos e coletivos). See also HUGO NIGRO MAZZILLI, A DEFESA
DOS INTERESSES DIFUSOS EM Julzo 41-55 (2001) (for a complete definition of these terms); Sn..vA, supra
note 49, at 40-41.
52. Federal Law 6,938 of Aug. 31, 1981, art. 14, ch. IV, §1.
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became recognized as the foremost expert in Brazilian environmental
law, suggested the inclusion of this provision of the law. 3
A couple years after the passage of the 1981 Act, the Ministrio
Ptiblico of So Paulo created a new prosecutorial position
specializing in environmental protection. In 1983, dynamite
explosions in a stone quarry caused a rockslide that ruptured an oil
pipeline and provoked a large oil spill on the Sao Paulo coast. The
Sao Paulo attorney general appointed one of his prosecutors, Edis
Milar6, to work on this case. In November 1983, Milar6 filed the first
lawsuit pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act seeking to
impose civil liability on the construction company and the state-
owned oil company for the environmental harm caused by the spill.
The lawsuit was well-covered by the press and began building the
reputation of the Ministgrio Ptiblico as an actor in environmental
protection.
54
The Sao Paulo Ministirio Ptiblico also played a significant role in
the passage of the Public Civil Action Law. In the late 1970s,
Brazilian legal scholars began discussing the need for legal protection
of group rights, drawing inspiration from the American class action
and the "access to justice" writings of Cappelletti.55 In 1982, the Sao
Paulo Association of Judges (Associagdo Paulista de Magistrados)
established a commission of four law professors and judges to draft a
law enabling the legal protection of group rights. 5 6  The
Commission's bill focused on giving civil society organizations the
legal power to file lawsuits on behalf of diffuse rights in the area of
environment and cultural heritage, and it was introduced in the
Brazilian legislature in early 1984.57
53. Interview with Paulo Affonso Leme Machado, Piracicaba, Slo Paulo, Brazil
(Dec. 13, 2001). When asked about the provision, he explains that he wrote it because he "thought that
the Minist~rio Piblico needed to have some involvement in the [environmental] area."
54. See Interview with Edis Milar6, Sao Paulo, Brazil (Oct. 8, 2001).
55. See ARANTES, supra note 4, at 54-55 (discussing Cappelletti's "access to justice" writings and
mentioning other Italian scholars that also influenced Brazilian doctrine, including Vittorio Denti and
Andrea Proto Pisani).
56. See id. at 58; SILVA, supra note 49, at 45-46.
57. See id.
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Prompted by the Commission's work, several prosecutors in the
S~o Paulo Ministgrio Ptiblico initiated an institutional discussion
about the role of the Ministirio Pfiblico in the protection of diffuse
interests and the ways that the bill might be rewritten to enable the
Ministirio Ptiblico to play a more significant role in this new legal
area. With the endorsement of the SAo Paulo Ministgrio Piblico, they
authored a new bill based on the one drafted by the Commission that
strengthened the institution's role. While both bills gave the
Ministgrio Ptiblico, as well as civil society organizations, jurisdiction
to bring public civil actions, the Ministgrio Ptiblico's version
included several innovations that favored the institution. Most
importantly, it created the civil investigation, which the Ministgrio
Ptiblico could use to collect evidence in preparation for a public civil
action. 58 The Ministgrio PiTblico's bill also expanded the interests that
could be defended in a public civil action to include consumer
interests and "any other diffuse interest.,
59
The Ministirio Pblico's bill was sent through the S~o Paulo
Attorney General to the Federal Ministry of Justice in June 1984, and
it was introduced to the National Congress as a proposal of the
executive branch in February 1985.60 Unlike the Commission's bill,
the Ministgrio Pziblico's bill received prompt attention and was
quickly passed by both houses of Congress. 61 On July 24, 1985, the
bill became the Public Civil Action Law.
The 1985 law was hailed as a significant innovation in Brazilian
civil procedure and as a significant legal advance for the Ministrio
Pfiblico as an institution. One prosecutor writes "the law represented,
without doubt, a 'revolution' in the Brazilian legal order, as the
judicial process stopped being seen as a instrument merely for the
defense of individual interests and became seen as an effective
58. See id. at 72-73.
59. See RUDOLFO DE CAMARGO MANCUSO, A(rAO CIVIL POBLICA 37-39 (1999). The provision of
the bill stating that the public civil action could be used to defend "any other diffuse interest" was vetoed
by the president However, this provision was reinserted in amendments made to the law in the
Consumer Defense Code, Federal Law 8,078 of Sept. 11, 1990. Id.
60. See SILVA, supra note 49, at 46.
61. See id.; ARANTES, supra note 4, at 59-60.
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mechanism for the participation of society in ... those conflicts that
involve supra-individual interests.' 62 Another prosecutor states that
the Public Civil Action Law "inaugurated a new phase of Brazilian
law and opened a new horizon for the activities of the Ministrio
Ptiblico in the civil sphere. . . . In this new phase, the prosecutor
assumes the role of a true lawyer of the collective and diffuse
interests of society.
' 63
2. Constitutional Law: The Federal Constitution of 1988
The passage of the Federal Constitution of 1988 consolidated the
Ministgrio Pztblico's new role as a defender of societal interests.
Most importantly, it made the Ministgrio Pzblico substantially
independent of the three traditional branches of government and
constitutionalized its new role in the protection of diffuse interests.
Here too, the institution played a significant role in establishing the
legal framework that would govern its work on behalf of diffuse
interests.
Three constitutional articles were dedicated to the institution.
Article 127 set forth the institution's general character, proclaiming
the Ministrio Pztblico to be "a permanent institution, essential to the
judicial function of the State, responsible for the defense of the legal
order, the democratic regime and the indispensable interests of
society and individuals. ' 64 It further granted the Ministgrio Pblico
"administrative and functional autonomy" with the power to submit
its proposals regarding the creation and extinction of jobs, the
institutional budget, and career advancement plans directly to the
legislature.65
Article 128 defined the institution's structure and job guarantees. It
determined that the attorney general of each Ministirio Ptiblico must
be a prosecutor from within that Ministgrio P~blico, generally chosen
62. MILARE, supra note 4, at 510.
63. Ronaldo Porto Macedo Jinior, A Evolu(Oo Institucional do Ministirio Pdblico Brasileiro, in
UNA INTRODUCAO AO ESTUDO DA JUSTI(A 42 (Maria Tereza Sadek ed., 1995).
64. Constitui9do Federal (C.F.) 1988, art. 127 (Braz.).
65. Id.
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by the executive from a list of three prosecutors elected by the
institution. It also guaranteed all prosecutors job security after a two-
year trial period, protection against involuntary transfer to another
geographic location, and protection against salary reductions. Finally,
it established several restrictions on prosecutors, prohibiting them, for
example, from working on the side as private lawyers, receiving
honorary fees or private reimbursement for their work, and
participating in political party activities.
Article 129 listed the institutional functions of the Ministdrio
Ptiblico including, in addition to its traditional criminal and civil
functions, several relating to its new role in protecting diffuse
interests. Most importantly, it defined "advocat[ing] zealously to
ensure that the government and publicly relevant services have
effectively respected the rights ensured in this constitution by taking
the necessary measures to guarantee this," and "us[ing] investigations
and public civil actions to protect the public and social patrimony, the
environment, and other diffuse and collective interests" as
institutional functions.
66
As such, the new constitution made the Ministdrio Pblico largely
autonomous from the traditional three branches of government. As
analyzed by Mazzilli, its autonomy is established through different
types of constitutional guarantees.67 First, the constitution provides
for autonomy in the administration of the institution (garantias nas
atividades-meio), mainly through its Article 127 powers described
above. Second, the constitution provides for autonomy in carrying
out of its functions (garantias nas atividades-fim). In other words, it
is not subordinated to any other governmental organs in the three
traditional branches but rather determines which activities it
undertakes subject only to the constitution and other laws. Finally,
the constitution provides individual functional autonomy to each
prosecutor, bolstered by the job guarantees of Article 128 (garantias
dos 6rgdos e agentes). Each prosecutor independently chooses how
66. See id. art. 129, I-HIL.
67. See Hugo Nigro Mazzilli, Independincia do Ministirio Ptiblico, in MINISTtRIO POBLICO:
INSTITuICO E PROCESSO 104-15 (Antonio Augusto Mello de Camargo Ferraz ed., 1999).
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to conduct the investigations and lawsuits in his jurisdiction without
fear of dismissal, demotion, or involuntary transfer to another
jurisdiction. Having emerged from the constitutional process as an
independent institution, the Minist4rio Pziblico is often referred to as
the fourth branch of government (o quarto poder).6 8
The Ministgrio Ptiblico was intimately involved in forging its new
role during the Constitutional Assembly of 1988. The Ministgrio
Pziblico lobbied on behalf of constitutionalizing its new role in the
defense of diffuse interests and, moreover, argued that it needed
independence from the other branches to fulfill this new role. While
the Minist~rio Ptiblico of Sdo Paulo and a couple other southern
states led the lobbying effort, the effort was national in scale as
leaders of the Ministgrio Ptiblico throughout Brazil participated in the
meetings that defined the Ministdrio Pblico's proposal and helped to
persuade the constitutional assembly to support it. In what has been
referred to as the greatest institutional novelty of the Constitution of
1988, the Ministgrio Pziblico was largely successful in getting the
profile it sought.
69
To understand the institutional trajectory of the Brazilian
Minist~rio Pblico, it is important to realize that the institution had a
long-held institutional interest of increasing its autonomy from the
executive branch. In the period of democratization, this institutional
interest dovetailed with its interest in taking a leading role in the
protection of the new set of emergent diffuse and collective rights. As
Claudio Ferraz de Alvarenga, a leader of the S~o Paulo Ministgrio
PzNblico in the 1980s, explains:
The great victory was to stipulate in the Constitution that the
Ministgrio Ptiblico has administrative autonomy, political autonomy,
financial autonomy, and budget-making autonomy. This was the
great work of construction.... What was always desired was to head
in the direction of this autonomy, of this independence-to be able to
68. See HUGO NIGRO MAZZILLI, MANUAL DO PROMOTOR DE JUSTIYA 39 (1991).
69. See Nunes, supra note 46, at 61.
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use this to freely work in defense of society, even when faced with
abuses by the executive branch.7°
Arantes explains that the Ministirio Pziblico went to the
Constitutional Assembly "with the discourse that its political
independence was essential to the future constitutional democracy
and a guarantee for society more than for the institution itself."71
With these arguments, the Ministgrio PiTblico lobbied for the
constitutional provisions that made it almost completely autonomous
of the other three branches of government and gave individual
prosecutors job security similar to that ofjudges.
The story of the Minist~rio Piblico's success in the Constitution of
1988 is a story about strong, organized leadership.72 Leaders of the
Sdo Paulo Ministgrio Pziblico networked and coordinated with
institutional leaders from other states throughout the country. These
leaders built consensus within the institution about its role and
effectively lobbied legislators to achieve their vision. Alvarenga
states:
It was an extremely competent group, it was a group of people
with great character, people who loved the Ministirio Pfiblico
and thought a lot about a new ideological formulation of the
Minist6rio Pfiblico. It was people who drew upon the work of
previous members of the institution as well as contemporary
work to create a new way of thinking about the Minist6rio
P-iblico that would overcome certain difficulties that the
institution had. At that time, for example, the Minist6rio Paiblico
was tied to the executive branch and the executive branch
practically controlled the institution. This was something that the
70. Bonelli, supra note 49.
71. ARANTES, supra note 4, at 77.
72. On political skill and institutional leadership, see generally MARTIN A. LEVIN & BARBARA
FERMAN, THE POLITICAL HAND: POLICY IMPLEMENTATION AND YOUTH EMPLOYMENT PROGRAMS
(1985); EUGENE BARDACH, THE SKILL FACTOR IN POLITICS; REPEALING THE MENTAL COMMITMENT
LAWS IN CALIFORNIA (1972); ROBERT A. KAGAN, Regulatory Enforcement, in HANDBOOK OF
REGULATIONS AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (David H. Rosenbloom & Richard D. Schwartz eds., 1994).
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prosecutors didn't agree with. They wanted to change this and
create a truly independent institution.73
For several years before the passage of the Constitution, meetings
were organized to discuss the future of the institution and determine
what the institution would seek in terms of its rights and
responsibilities in the new constitution.74 In June 1985, the Sixth
National Conference of the Ministgrio Pziblico was held in Sdo Paulo
and many papers were presented on the topic of the position and
organization of the institution in the future constitution.75 In October
1985, the National Association of Members of the Ministirio Pliblico
sent a questionnaire to all 5793 prosecutors throughout the country to
gather opinions on future constitutional provisions, and almost 1000
prosecutors responded.76 In the First National Meeting of Attorney
Generals and Presidents of Associations of the Ministgrio Pblico,
held in 1986, leaders of the Ministgrio Pziblico from many states
endorsed a draft of the constitutional provisions relating to the
Ministgrio Pztblico.
77
While the proposal suffered some modifications in the
constitutional assembly, the Ministgrio Pztblico basically emerged
with the profile that it had proposed-as a defender of the public
interest, with institutional guarantees allowing it to be sufficiently
independent to challenge the actions of the government.78 Alvarenga
describes the intensity of their work in organizing and lobbying on
behalf of the institution:
We worked hard to get things . . . [i]n each situation, the
Minist~rio Pblico sought to validate its profile, further the
vision, strengthen its autonomy. At each point, the Ministdrio
Niblico moved forward a step because we had all the work of
73. Bonelli, supra note 49.
74. See HUGO NIGRO MAZZILLI, 0 MINISTtRIO PU BLICO NA CONSTITUI(CAO DE 1988 24 (1989).
75. See MAZZILLI, supra note 68, at 22.
76. See id. at 23.
77. See MAZZILLI, supra note 74, at 30.
78. See id. at 20.
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previous generations-ideas, objectives-and we knew what we
wanted ... [i]n the constitutional process .... [W]e mobilized
the Ministdrio PNiblico from all over Brazil-it was not just us, it
was the institution that did this. We had a vision, we knew what
we wanted, and we worked like madmen. In terms of
coordination, we participated in everything that happened in the
Constitutional Congress, with prosecutors from all over Brazil.
When differences arose among the state Ministdios Piblicos, we
were always able to find an equilibrium point. We had great
support in the constitutional convention.79
The combination of institutional independence with the power to
investigate and file public civil actions on behalf of a large variety of
diffuse and collective interests made the Brazilian Ministirio Pliblico
a very powerful political actor. 80 Its new role involved prosecutors in
significant political and social debates: governmental corruption,
environmental protection, urban development, public health,
education, and many others. As explained by one prosecutor,
"through its innumerable investigations and lawsuits, [the Ministgrio
Ptiblico] began to question a series of extremely pertinent practices
involving large economic interests of private groups as well as the
government itself. The Ministgrio Ptiblico's actions began to directly
affect public policies and social interests."
81
Comparing the Brazilian Ministgrio PTblico with the Ministdrio
Pztblico in nine other countries, Nunes finds that on the spectrum of
independence from political control, the Brazilian Ministdrio Piblico
exhibits the extreme case of independence. 82  Moreover, the
Ministgrio Pziblico of Brazil has been observed to be almost unique
among similar institutions throughout the world in terms of its power
79. Bonelli, supra note 49.
80. See Ronaldo Porto Macedo Jnior, Ministgrio Piblico Brasileiro: um Novo Ator Politico, in
MINISTtRIo POBLICO II: DEMOCRACIA 103 (Josd Marcelo Menezes Vigliar & Ronaldo Porto Macedo
Jinior eds., 1999).
81. Id. at 109.
82. See Fibio Josd Kerche Nunes, 0 Minist~rio Nblico e a Constituinte de 1987/88, 12, 28 (1997)
(unpublished master's thesis, University of Slo Paulo) (on file with author).
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83to act in defense of public interests. As stated by Alvarenga, "[w]ith
the constitution, [the Ministdrio Nblico] gained a lot of new
responsibilities and a very modem, advanced new institutional
profile-it was given the most advanced profile in the world and I
doubt that there is a comparable Ministdrio Pfiblico in any other
country of the world.,
84
3. Substantive Laws
In the years following the passage of the Federal Constitution of
1988, a number of substantive laws were passed that expanded the
statutory basis for diffuse and collective interests and the Ministgrio
Pblico's role in defending them. In 1989, federal laws were passed
establishing the rights of disabled people 85 and stock market
investors. 86 In 1990, a new children's rights law (Estatuto da Crianva
e do Adolescente)87 and consumer defense code (C6digo de Defesa
do Consumidor)88  were passed. In 1992, a law concerning
government corruption was passed (Lei de Improbidade
Administrativa),89 and a new antitrust law was passed (Lei Antitruste)
in 1994.90 All these laws established new diffuse and collective
interests and specifically granted the Ministgrio Ptiblico a role in
defending them using the public civil action. The Consumer Defense
Code is of particular importance because it amended the Public Civil
Action Law to allow the instrument to be used to defend "any diffuse
or collective interest," a clause that had been vetoed when the law
was originally signed in 1985.91 It also amended the 1985 law to
83. See Macedo Hinior, supra note 63, at 39.
84. Bonelli, supra note 49.
85. See Federal Law No. 7,853 of Oct. 24, 1989.
86. See Federal Law No. 7,913 of Dec. 7, 1989.
87. See Federal Law No. 8,069 of July 13, 1990.
88. See Federal Law No. 8,078 of Sept. 11, 1990.
89. See Federal Law No. 8,429 of June 2, 1992.
90. See Federal Law No. 8,884 of June 11, 1994.
91. Federal Constitution of 1988, art. 129, HI, had already given the Ministrio Pdblico power to use
investigations and lawsuits to protect any diffuse or collective interest. This amendment thus primarily
affected the other potential plaintiffs in public civil action groups, such as other governmental and non-
governmental entities.
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allow the Ministgrio Pblico to settle cases extrajudicially and to
create a legal mechanism to enable group litigation seeking
damages.92
B. Building the Institution
In the years following the passage of the Federal Constitution of
1988, the Brazilian Ministrio Pziblico underwent a period of
institution building and renewal based upon its new role in public law
litigation. The signs of the new Minist~rio Ptiblico were apparent in
its growth and specialization; increasingly selective recruitment and
training; and a strong new institutional esprit de corps. As shown
below, the Brazilian Ministgrio Pztblico became a strong institution
with talented, energetic and well-compensated prosecutors imbued
with a sense of institutional mission and esprit de corps in the work
of protecting the public interest.
1. Growth and Specialization
Even as hiring tended to stagnate in the public sector in Brazil in
the 1990s, the Sao Paulo Ministgrio Ptiblico was able to grow
markedly. The number of prosecutors in Sao Paulo state almost
doubled over the same period, increasing from 849 to 1,620.9' The
physical and administrative infrastructure of the Ministgrio Ptiblico
grew to accommodate the new prosecutors. Historically, prosecutors
had worked inside the courthouse and had little or no administrative
support. By the late 1990s, the Sao Paulo Ministgrio Pztblico acquired
a new headquarters building, hired 2,500 administrative staff, and
became computerized. 94 To pay for these changes, the budget of the
92. See Gidi, supra note 3.
93. MCALLISTER, supra note 43, at 76. There was similar growth in other Ministdrios Ptiblicos in
Brazil as well. Between 1985 and 2002, the number of state and federal prosecutors in Brazil almost
doubled, from less than 6,000 in 1985 to about 10,000 in 2002. Id.; see also Maria Tereza Sadek &
RosAngela Batista Cavalcanti, The New Brazilian Public Prosecution: An Agent of Accountability, in
DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY IN LATIN AMERICA 209 (Scott Mainwaring & Christopher Welna eds.,
2003).
94. See MARIA DA GLORIA BONELLI, PROFISSIONALISMO E POLITICA NO MUNDO DO DIREiTo 157
(2002).
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Ministrio Pziblico of So Paulo grew significantly, particularly in the
early and mid-1990s.95
With growth came greater prosecutorial specialization, particularly
in the new areas of diffuse and collective interests. A brief
explanation of the general course of a prosecutorial career in Brazil is
helpful in understanding how this growth enabled specialization.
Prosecutors are hired through a competitive civil service exam
(concurso ptiblico), as described further below. During the first two
years of their careers, prosecutors are considered to be "in training"
and they work in a judicial district (comarca) with other prosecutors.
After these two years, they acquire full job guarantees and are usually
assigned to a less populated judicial district, often in a rural area
where they serve as the only prosecutor. As the sole prosecutor, they
are responsible for all areas of prosecutorial responsibility within
their judicial district, including criminal prosecution as well as the
diverse areas of civil prosecution, including the protection of diffuse
and collective interests.
As the prosecutor receives promotions, he moves to more
populated judicial districts where there are more prosecutors, and he
has the opportunity to increasingly specialize his work in the criminal
or civil area. After several promotions to larger cities and towns, he
may be promoted to a position in the capital city. In the capital, he
may completely specialize in one area of law such as environmental
protection or prosecution of homicides. Ultimately, after many years
of service, the prosecutor may be promoted to become an "appeals
court prosecutor" (procurador). As an appeals court prosecutor, he
deals only with cases that have reached the appeals court and his
work generally becomes less specialized, covering many areas of
law. Prosecutors at this level of the profession are often heavily
involved in institutional leadership as a member of the institutional
95. See Antonio Araldo Ferraz Dal Pozzo, 1990-1993: Um Relatrrio de Reformas, 55 JUSTITIA 163,
173 (1993) (showing there was a 103% real increase in the Slo Paulo Ministirio P~blico's budget
between 1990 and 1991); ASSOCtA.AO PAULISTA DO MINISTtIRIO PUBLICO, 0 MP E A CRISE
ORCAMENTARIA 49 (Renato Nascimento Fabbrini ed., 2002) (after adjusting for inflation, the budget
data presented shows there was another 100% real increase in the SAo Paulo Ministerio Pzblico's budget
between 1994 and 1995).
2008l
HeinOnline -- 24 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 717 2007-2008
) I    717 
iniste  u li  ao   
 
 t ri l ,  
 ief 
 l    
i    
  
rso u ),   
     
 arca)  
 
 l  
,  
i l      
 l ti   
    
  
    ,    
 
l    
   
   ,  
t l     
  
t r  l  
 curador).  
   
 f 
 il  
 l   
  rn to i  , I  , 
)  a isterio u lico's  
  sSOCIAC;:Ji.O   E I      
!; AI     
t  r t   t r   t r  r l i r  i  t  a  l  i i t rio u li '  t 
 . 
25
McAllister: Revisiting a "Promising Institution":  Public Law Litigation in t
Published by Reading Room, 2008
GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
council, as the general secretary, as the attorney general, or other
leadership position.
In 2001, about 750 Sao Paulo state prosecutors worked in the
capital city of Sao Paulo, and the other 870 worked in judicial
districts throughout the rest of the state.96 The city of Sao Paulo had
specialized prosecutors in seven areas of diffuse and collective
interests: environmental protection, constitutional rights, children's
rights, worker health and safety, housing and urban problems,
consumer protection, and disability rights. To assist unspecialized
prosecutors in conducting cases in the more specialized areas of law,
the Sao Paulo Ministgrio PzfTlico established Prosecution Support
Centers (Centros de Apoio Operacional) in the state for each area of
law. These centers were staffed by prosecutors experienced in that
area of law and, in some cases, other professionals with expertise
relating to that area. Other state and federal Ministgrio Pliblicos in
Brazil also developed similar centers to provide institutional support
and training in specialized areas of law for prosecutors.
The area of environmental protection serves as an example of how
the institution developed its expertise in the protection of a diffuse
interest. By 2001, So Paulo city had five specialized environmental
prosecutor positions as well as an Environmental Prosecution Support
Center (Centro de Apoio Operacional das Promotorias de Justia de
Meio Ambiente) staffed by three other prosecutors and several
scientists. Other medium and large cities in the state tended to have
several semi-specialized environmental prosecutors, responsible for
an area such as consumer defense as well. Even in smaller towns, it
was often possible to have at least two prosecutors, allowing one to
specialize in criminal matters and the other to specialize in civil
matters. In total, there were about 350 Sao Paulo state prosecutors
with responsibility for environmental protection, including
specialized, semi-specialized, and unspecialized prosecutors.
96. MCALLISTER, supra note 43, at 79.
[Vol. 24:693
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2. Selective Recruitment
A second sign of the emergence of a new Ministrio Ptiblico was
the high selectivity of its recruitment processes. Entrance to the
Ministgrio Pztblico became very selective, and Ministgrio PTblico
prosecutors were privileged within the government bureaucracy in
terms of salary. Even as hiring froze and salaries stagnated in the
public sector in Brazil in the 1990s, the Silo Paulo Ministgrio Pziblico
maintained its growth and continued to offer very competitive
salaries. The institution's selective recruitment and generous
compensation provides further evidence of the extent to which the
Ministgrio Ptiblico has become a strong institution in Brazil.
The Ministgrio Pziblico recruits through a very selective civil
service exam (concurso ptiblico) and thousands of applicants
competed for tens of positions each year throughout the 1990s.
Candidates are generally recent law graduates, and they often spend a
year preparing for the exam through enrollment at the "School of the
Ministirio Ptiblico" affiliated with the institution.97 The exam is
given in three increasingly selective phases-a multiple-choice test,
an essay exam, and an oral exam and interview-spanning the course
of almost one year. While hiring was historically quite selective, it
became even more selective in the 1990s. In the early 1990s, the Sdo
Paulo Ministgrio PiNblico hired, on average, 3.3% of candidates who
took the civil service exam.98 In the late 1990s, this average dropped
to 1.3%. 9'
High salaries and prestige contribute to and reinforce the
selectivity of the profession. Like judges, prosecutors are well
compensated among governmental employees. The basic salary of a
Sdo Paulo prosecutor who has completed the two year training period
is about R$7000/month, over twice that of a private lawyer in S~o
Paulo, four times that of the average college graduate employed by
the government in S~o Paulo, and thirty-five times the minimum
97. See id. at 77.
98. Id. at 77.
99. See id.
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wage.' 00 Salaries increase significantly depending on promotions and
time of service, culminating with a salary of over R$15,000/month
for a Sao Paulo prosecutor with twenty years of service who has been
promoted to become an appeals-court prosecutor, the highest echelon
of the institution which included about one-eighth of Sao Paulo
prosecutors. 10 1 As suggested by the salary, prosecutors enjoy a high
degree of prestige. They are generally considered to be very smart
and capable individuals, and as the profession has become
increasingly selective, this perception has been reinforced.
3. Esprit de Corps
In addition to marked institutional growth and increasing
selectivity, the new Ministirio Ptiblico is characterized by a strong
degree of esprit de corps that supports its public interest activity.
Scholars have noted that an administrative elite with a strong sense of
esprit de corps arises under certain circumstances in public
administration. 102 Describing this phenomenon, Perez Perdomo
explains that where esprit de corps is present, "[t]he group is
composed of individuals who identify with each other and serve, or
say that they serve, the public interest and are usually aware of their
own status and privileges."'1 3 This esprit de corps is evident in the
discourse of prosecutors about the importance of their work. There is
generally a strong identification among prosecutors deriving from the
shared experiences of passing a very selective exam, learning how to
be a prosecutor alone in the "trial-by-fire" conditions of a remote
judicial district, and being promoted through the ranks to ultimately
100. Salary data for the Slo Paulo Ministirio Pdblico was acquired from the General Directorate of
the Sio Paulo Ministirio Ptiblico. Data on other salaries are from the 2001 RAIS (Rela~do Anual de
InformagSes Sociais), published annually by the Minist~rio do Trabalho e Emprego. The minimum
salary in Brazil was R$180 per month from April 2001 to March 2002, after which it increased to R$200
per month.
101. MCALLISTER, supra note 43, at 78.
102. See, e.g., HERBERT KAUFMAN, THE FOREST RANGER, A STUDY IN ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR
(1960).
103. Rogelio P~rez-Perdomo, Corruption and Political Crisis, in LESSONS OF THE VENEZUELAN
EXPERIENCE 317 (Louis W. Goodman et al. eds., 1995).
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arrive back to the capital city, where many of the prosecutors were
educated and perhaps even knew each other in law school. Frequent
conferences and seminars allow prosecutors to meet, see each other
through the years, and follow each other's careers.
The public service ethos is very present in the Brazilian Ministrio
Pztblico. As written in 1991 by one So Paulo prosecutor:
There's a lot of strength and idealism, there's a lot of fight in the
institution, and there's a lot of work to be done .... [I]n each
judicial district of this country, there is a public prosecutor that
attends the public, that pursues criminals rich or poor, that
defends the environment, that works on behalf of those injured
on the job, the disabled, the workers.' 4
The young average age of Brazilian prosecutors, a product of the
rapid institutional growth in the 1980s and 1990s, contributes to a
prevailing sense of idealism. In Sao Paulo, newly hired prosecutors in
the mid-1990s were, on average, twenty-seven years old. 10 5 The
average age of Sao Paulo prosecutors in 1997 was thirty-seven and a
half years old, and only a third were over forty. 106 The age profile of
prosecutors in other states was similar. A 1996 study of the
Ministgrio Pblico of seven Brazilian states including Sao Paulo
found the average age of prosecutors to be thirty-three. 1
07
Brazilian scholars have noted a strong sense of institutional
mission among prosecutors. Arantes calls it an "ideology of political
voluntarism" (ideologia do voluntarismo politico) and finds that it is
rooted in two beliefs that are widely-held by prosecutors. 108 First,
prosecutors believe that civil society is too weak and disorganized to
defend its own interests. Second, prosecutors believe that the
government often violates or offends the public interest. From these
104. MAZZILLI, supra note 68, at 19.
105. Calculated from data in the listing of prosecutors ("Lista de Antigaidade") of December 1997,
published in the January 1998 issue of Justitia (the journal of the Sdo Paulo Ministdrio Ptiblico).
106. See id.
107. See WtECKO V. DE CASTILHO & SADEK, supra note 49, at 9.
108. ARANTES, supra note 4, at 119.
20081
HeinOnline -- 24 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 721 2007-2008
)    721 
l  t rs  
    
   
'   
    i  inisterio 
u lico.  ao  
'   
'  . 1  
    
l   
t,   
. 10  
i  ,  
  
ili    i li . I   l ,     
,  01 0   
    
   ty.106  
t rs  
erio ubl     
 a e of prosecutors to be thirty-three. 107 
     
    
 l gia  is o i )  
  
t rs     i   
t r    
  
. I l, s r  t  , t . 
. alc late  fr  t  i  t  listi  f r s t rs ( i t   ti iii e")  r , 
lis  i  t  J r   i   titia (t  j r l  t  il  l  erio u lico). 
. i . 
.  I  .  TI   ,   ,   
. NTES,supranote4, t . 
29
McAllister: Revisiting a "Promising Institution":  Public Law Litigation in t
Published by Reading Room, 2008
GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
beliefs emerges their view that the Ministrio Ptiblico plays an
essential role in defending the public interest against a frequently
predatory state. As Arantes states, "[flrom this equation emerges the
proposition, instrumental in nature, that 'someone' should intervene
in the state-society relationship in defense of the latter."' 1 9 Many
Brazilian prosecutors consider themselves to be that someone.
Prosecutors are motivated and energetic in their public interest
work, perhaps even to the detriment of the traditional criminal
defense work of the institution. A survey of state and federal
prosecutors carried out in 1996 showed that while 72% of prosecutors
prioritized criminal work in the past, only 61% planned to in the
future. 110 In contrast, while 32% of prosecutors had prioritized
environmental protection in the previous two years, 43% planned to
prioritize it in the next two years. There were similar increases in
plans to give priority to other public interest areas including fighting
political corruption, consumer protection, and advocacy on behalf of
the elderly and handicapped. Interpreting this data, Arantes states,
"[t]here are strong signs, therefore, that the ideology of political
voluntarism is mobilizing an ever larger number of prosecutors to
give more attention to diffuse and collective rights, implying
stagnation or even decline-in terms of priority-in the traditional
areas of the institution's work like criminal prosecution."' 11 Many
prosecutors perceive the institution's civil work to be more dynamic
and important than its criminal work.' 
12
109. Id. at 129.
110. The survey was conducted by the Institute of Economic, Social, and Political Studies of Sdo
Paulo (IDESP, Instituto de Estudos Econdmicos, Sociais e Politicos de Sdo Paulo). It included fifty-one
members of the federal Ministirio Pblico and 712 members of state Ministerios Pblicos comprising 20%
of all members of the Ministgrio Ptiblico of each of seven states: Goias, Sergipe, Bahia, Slo Paulo, Rio de
Janeiro, Paran, and Rio Grande do Sul. Results of the survey are published in Sadek, supra note 49, and
discussed in ARANTEs, supra note 4, at 115-27.
Ill. ARANTES, supra note 4, at 118-19.
112. See id.
[Vol. 24:693
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C. Doing Public Law Litigation
With its new legal framework and institutional restructuring, the
Minist~rio Ptiblico had the conditions to engage in group litigation on
behalf of statutory and constitutional rights. The Ministerio Pztblico
became a "fourth branch" of government dedicated to the
enforcement of statutory and constitutional rights on behalf of
societal groups and public interests generally. 1 3 While other
governmental entities as well as civil society organizations were also
legally authorized to file public civil actions, the Minist~rio Ptiblico
has filed over ninety percent of them. 1 4 Private and public entities
that are also authorized to file public civil actions often choose to
make complaints or notifications to the Ministgrio Pztblico instead.
As proclaimed in a 1991 meeting of environmental prosecutors
throughout Brazil, "[w]hat happened, above all, is a remarkable
transformation which places Brazil as one of the most pioneering
countries in the world in terms of this new function of the Minist6rio
PNiblico, making it the most qualified institution to protect social,
diffuse, and collective interests in the civil order."' '15 This section first
reviews how Brazilian prosecutors develop their cases and then
discusses the various areas in which the Sdo Paulo Ministgrio Pztblico
has focused.
1. Case Development
Investigations are the starting point for the Ministgrio Pliblico's
public law work. Prosecutors open investigations when they are made
aware of a potential offense or harm to a diffuse or collective interest
by a public complaint or by a notification from another government
agency.116 With prosecutors stationed in each local jurisdiction,
prosecutors are known for their accessibility and responsiveness to
113. See MAZZILLI, supra note 68, at 39.
114. See Cappelli, supra note 44.
115. O MINISTRIO PIBLICO E A DEFESA DO MEIO AMBIENTE 243 (-dis Milar6 ed.,1992).
116. See Federal Law No. 7,347 of 1985, art. 6 (stating "Any person may, and a civil servant has the
duty to, inform the Minist6rio lNblico of facts which may constitute the object of a public civil action").
20081
HeinOnline -- 24 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 723 2007-2008
)   723 
.  li  ti  
l i ,  
terio u lico    
lf r   i l  t rio ublic  
  f rt  "  t t   
t   t ti al   f 
   I 13   
  t    
l ll      , terio u lico 
 fil  r i t  r t  t . 1  i t     
t t r  l  t i  t  il      
 t   i terio u li  
   tal  
t r t r il, [  ] at ,  ,   l  
t ti        
  teri  
ubli ,   t  
,     I 15   
r i s  r ili  r t r  l  t i     
i  t  ri  r  i  i  t  a  l  terio u lic  
 
.   
I ti ti  r  t  t rti  i t  t  i i terio u li '  
li   . t rs   
r    t ti l ff  r  t   i   ll ti  t 
  li       t 
ncy.116    i , 
t     t i  lit  ss  
.  I, ra  
.  lli, ra  . 
liS. 0 I ISTERIO UBLI        &tis l n\  
.  r l  . ,   , rt.  ( t ti    ,       
t  t , i f nn t e i isteri  PUblic  f f ts i   tit t  t  j t   li  i il ti . 
31
McAllister: Revisiting a "Promising Institution":  Public Law Litigation in t
Published by Reading Room, 2008
GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
public complaints, particularly in small and medium sized towns.11 7
Prosecutors may also open investigations without provocation from
an external source.1 1 8 After opening a civil investigation, prosecutors
pursue evidence by meeting with complainants, potential defendants
and other interested or knowledgeable parties and by requesting
relevant documents and reports from public and private entities.119
Investigations usually lead to one of three outcomes: the investigation
may be terminated for lack of evidence of harm; a public civil action
may be filed based on the information collected; or the case may be
settled during the investigation, with the signing of a formal
settlement agreement. 120
To file a public civil action, the prosecutor must be able to
characterize the harm and identify the responsible party. Prosecutors
may file public civil actions to address both completed harms and
potential future harms. In cases where the harm has already occurred,
the court may order the party to pay money damages to a state fund
or it may enjoin the party to take a certain action (obrigaqdo defazer)
or to abstain from taking a certain action (obrigaqdo de ndofazer).121
Where harm is threatened by a party's activities, a prosecutor may
request a preliminary injunction (mandado liminar) in which the
court orders a party to take or abstain from taking a certain action as
an emergency measure before the court makes a final decision on the
merits of the case. To be granted a preliminary injunction, the
Ministgrio Ptiblico must show that its case has a good legal
foundation (fumis boni iuris) and that absent such an emergency
117. See 0 SISTEMA DE JUSTI(4A 16 (Maria Tereza Sadek ed., 1999) (stating "[t]his direct contact with
the public transforms the prosecutor, especially in small towns, into a very special agent of the state: a
government authority to whom access is easy, who has the power to resolve many types of questions and
to 'defend' the weak.").
118. One Sio Paulo prosecutor estimates that 80% of his environmental investigations are opened on
the basis of information that he reads in the newspaper. MCALLISTER, supra note 43, at 90.
119. See Federal Law No. 7,347 of 1985, art. 8, § 1 (providing that "The Ministrio Pblico can open
and preside over a civil investigation, requiring any private or public entity to submit certifications,
information, technical reports or opinions") (translation by author).
120. See MCALLISTER, supra note 43, at 90-93, 95.
121. See Federal Law No. 7,347 of 1985, art. 3, 13.
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order the objective of the lawsuit will be lost because the interest
being defended will be irreparably damaged (periculum in mora).
In the course of the investigation, settlement agreements are often
negotiated. 122 Formalized in a written instrument called a "conduct
adjustment agreement," settlements determine the actions that the
party must take to remedy the harm and any applicable monetary
penalties. In the case of noncompliance, the prosecutor may judicially
enforce the agreement. Enforcement lawsuits are won almost
automatically, given that the conduct adjustment agreement
represents the accused party's admission to causing the harm and his
acceptance of the agreement terms. Prosecutors settle more cases than
they litigate. In the area of consumer defense, for example, it has
been estimated that 90-95% of cases are resolved by settlement while
only 5-8% are litigated. 123 As a Sao Paulo prosecutor explains,
"[t]here are drawbacks to the formal legal process that affect the
parties directly, tiring them out emotionally and causing them
financial losses. When possible, the public civil action should be
avoided."' 124 Many prosecutors view settlement agreements as the
most efficient way to resolve cases and view filing a public civil
action as a last resort.' 2
5
2. Areas of Litigation
The Brazilian Ministgrio PzNblico is constitutionally authorized to
defend all types of diffuse and collective interests. In the 1980s and
1990s, the Sao Paulo Ministgrio Ptiblico developed civil litigation
practices in the areas of environmental protection, constitutional
122. See Federal Law No. 7,347, art. 5, II, § 6 (stating "[t]he public institutions with jurisdiction can
negotiate agreements to bring conduct into accord with legal requirements, with fines in case of
noncompliance, that will be considered judicially enforceable agreements.").
123. See Jos6 Geraldo Brito Filomeno, Aqdo Civil Phiblica Consumerisla, in AVAO CIVIL PUBLICA,
LE 7347/1985-15 ANoS 392 (tdis Milar6 ed., 2001).
124. Daniel Roberto Fink, Alternativa a Aqdo Civil Pdblico Ambiental (Reflexyes sobre as Vantagens
do Termo de Ajustamento de Conduta), in A ;)o CVIL PUBLICA, supra note 123, at 114.
125. See, e.g., Antonio Augusto Mello de Camargo Ferraz & Joao Lopes Guimaraes Jfinior, A
necessiria elaborarlo de uma nova doutrina de Minist6rio Pfiblico, compativel corn seu atual perfil
constitucional, in MINISTRIO PUBLICO: INSTITUI(rAO E PROCESSO 27 n.15 (Antonio Augusto Mello de
Camargo Ferraz ed., 1999).
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rights, children's rights, worker health and safety, housing and urban
problems, consumer protection, and disability rights. Table 1
provides data regarding the number of open cases, including both
investigations and public civil actions that the Sao Paulo Ministirio
Pblico had in each area in November 2001.126
TABLE 1: THE NUMBER OF OPEN INVESTIGATIONS AND PUBLIC CIVIL
ACTIONS BY THE SAO PAULO MINISTERIO POBLICO ACCORDING TO
AREA OF DIFFUSE AND COLLECTIVE INTERESTS, NOVEMBER 2001.
Area of Diffuse and Collective Number of Investigations and
Interests Public Civil Actions
Environmental Protection 9203
Constitutional Rights 9073
Children's Rights 8184
Worker Health and Safety 4374
Housing and Urban Problems 3801
Consumer Protection 1866
Disability Rights 252
This section describes the work of the S~o Paulo Minist~rio Pliblico
in each of these areas, providing information about the priorities that
have been set by the institution in each area and, when available,
examples of prominent cases.
a. Environmental Protection
In terms of numbers of investigations and actions, environmental
protection is the largest area of the Minist~rio Pfiblico's public law
work (see Table 1). As described above, it was the first area of
diffuse interests in which the Ministirio Pfiblico became involved.
Priorities of the SAo Paulo Ministirio Pfiblico in this area have
126. See Corregedoria Geral, Aviso No. 04/02 - CGMP, de 8 de fevereiro de 2002 (providing
statistics regarding the activities of the Slo Paulo Ministdrio Pblico in October and November 2001;
noting also that the data are partial rather than complete).
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included protecting parks and other legally protected lands;
promoting measures to harmonize agricultural activities with
environmental protection; and identifying and eliminating sources of
soil, air, water, noise, and electromagnetic pollution.'
27
One of the first lawsuits filed under the 1985 Public Civil Action
Law charged the twenty-four petrochemical and steel companies that
constituted Brazil's most important industrial district, Cubatao, for
$800 million worth of environmental damages. 128 The lawsuit
requested that the court hold the companies liable for the costs
associated with stabilizing the mountainsides that had become
susceptible to landslides; decontaminating the soils; cleaning and
recuperating local streams and rivers; and reforesting with native
species. 129 Other environmental lawsuits of the Sao Paulo Ministdrio
Pziblico have been filed to prevent the construction of manufacturing
facilities and theme parks in protected areas; to challenge
infrastructure projects with large environmental impacts; and to force
municipal and state governments to clean up rivers and hazardous
waste sites.
b. Constitutional Rights
The most visible area of the Sao Paulo Ministdrio Pztblico's work
has been in the area of constitutional rights, with an emphasis on anti-
corruption. In terms of the number of investigations and actions, it is
the second largest area of the institution's public law litigation
work. 130 Priorities have included promoting honest government by
working against illegal contracting, improper use or transfer of public
funds, the request for and acceptance of bribes, improper government
hiring decisions, illegal private enrichment from public funds, and
127. See Slo Paulo Minist~rio Piblico, Ato Normativo no. 276-PGJ, de 26 de fevereiro de 2002 (pt.
n* 94.646/01) [hereinafter General Plan of Activities-2002].
128. See MILARt, supra note 4, at 271 n.142. The lawsuit was filed by the Ministirio PNiblico with an
environmental group, 01KOS, as co-plaintiff. Id. at 579-83 (a reproduction of the initial complaint in
the case).
129. See id. at 579-83.
130. Seesupra Table 1.
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nepotism; promoting improvements in the quality and consistency of
public health services by working against the falsification of
medicines, fraud in the public health care system, and discriminatory
practices in the provision of health care; and improving the quality
and consistency of public services that are provided through private
concessions or contractors.
13 1
The Ministkrio Ptiblico's work against governmental corruption
has had significant political ramifications. Its investigations and
lawsuits have affected the careers of prominent politicians, including
several governors and many mayors in So Paulo state. For example,
Governor Orestes Qudrcia, in power from 1987 to 1991, was accused
by prosecutors of fraud and overpayment in the procurement of
scientific equipment from Israel and various illegalities in the
privatization of the state airline. 132 In 1998 and 1999, the Sao Paulo
Ministgrio Pziblico made news headlines for breaking a large
corruption ring in which Sao Paulo building inspectors threatened
large fines in order to collect bribes.' 33 Other large corruption cases
in the same year concerned fraud and overpayment in the
procurement of materials by the municipal health system and
municipal cemeteries and contracts made with phantom employees
by city concessionaires. 1
34
c. Children's Rights
The Sao Paulo Minist4rio Pziblico's institutional priorities in the
area of children's rights have included the use of extrajudicial and
judicial measures to ensure the availability, quality, and democratic
management of public schools, and the reform of juvenile
delinquency facilities to increase training and probation
opportunities. As shown in Table 1, this area of public law litigation
131. See General Plan of Activities-2002, supra note 127.
132. See ARANTES, supra note 4, at 154-55.
133. Seeid at 160-75.
134. See id. at 176-79.
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was the third largest in terms of the number of open investigation and
actions in 2001.
A study of 135 lawsuits brought by Sdo Paulo prosecutors in the
area of children's rights showed that fifty-three of them (39%)
concerned the area of education.' 35 Other large areas of litigation
included the government's implementation of local child welfare
councils, public benefits, and provision of health services. Of the 135
cases, 111 of them (82%) named municipal, state, or federal
government agencies as defendants. 136 A large number of the
education-related cases in the 1990s were provoked by a restructuring
in the state school system in which children were transferred to
different schools and new age requirements were imposed for
matriculation. 137 The Ministgrio Ptblico filed a number of lawsuits
against the state department of education and school directors based
on complaints they received from families whose children were
denied matriculation generally or access to their preferred school
because of the reforms. 138 These lawsuits sought not only corrections
of specific administrative decisions but also changes in the processes
by which state educational policies were determined, based on the
right to have access to a school "near home" and the general
democratic principle of "community participation."''
39
d. Worker Health and Safety
The Sdo Paulo Minist~rio Ptiblico also had a very large caseload in
the area of worker health and safety. 140 Priorities of state prosecutors
in the area of worker health and safety included identifying and
mitigating the largest health risks to workers and promoting
enforcement of regulations relating to workplace hygiene. 14' The
135. See SILVA, supra note 49, at 123.
136. Id. at 124.
137. See id. at 125.
138. See id. at 128.
139. Id. (quoted language is from one of the lawsuits, as described by Silva).
140. See supra Table 1.
141. See General Plan of Activities-2002, supra note 127.
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Ministgrio Pztblico's work on behalf of diffuse rights in this area
generally involves the investigation of conditions at workplaces
subject to worker complaints or notifications of serious injury or
deaths. 142 Where the Ministgrio Pblico verifies unsafe working
conditions, they negotiate a settlement agreement or file a lawsuit
seeking to bring the workplace into compliance with applicable
regulations. Prosecutors also do preventative work in this area,
seeking to proactively address unsafe working conditions and prevent
work accidents. 14
3
e. Housing and Urban Problems
In the area of housing and urban problems, priorities included
preventing illegal housing and land development; protecting urban
recreational areas; and promoting the use of municipal zoning and
planning tools. 144 In terms of the number of open investigations and
actions, it was the fifth most important area of the institution's public
law litigation work. 145 As described by a prosecutor who specialized
in the area of housing and urban issues in the city of Sao Paulo, the
work of the Ministirio Pblico focused on six areas: legalizing
illegally-constructed housing subdivisions and condominiums;
eliminating risks of unsafe housing; implementing laws concerning
land use, particularly zoning laws; overseeing the permitting of
concessions for the use of public space; overseeing the provision of
urban public services; and reducing visual pollution. 146 Broadly
speaking, prosecutors seek to ensure that laws concerning housing
and urban issues are implemented, and most of their lawsuits are
against municipal governments for allegedly failing to do so. 147
142. See Email to author from Carlos Alberto de Salles, SAo Paulo state prosecutor for worker health
and safety (May 14, 2004, 2:37 pm) (on file with author).
143. Seeid.
144. See General Plan of Activities-2002, supra note 127.
145. See supra Table 1.
146. See Email to author from Jolo Lopez GuimarAes, Slo Paulo state prosecutor for housing and
urban problems (May 10, 2004,3:15 pm) (on file with author).
147. Seeid.
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f Consumer Protection
In the area of consumer protection, the S~o Paulo Ministgrio
Ptiblico's priorities have included fighting false or abusive
advertising and imposing liability for such advertising; fighting other
abusive practices such as conditioning the provision of one product or
service on another; sending or giving the consumer a product or
service that was not requested; the selling of products that do not
conform to applicable legal requirements; the use of anti-competitive
practices; and the inclusion of unfair terms in contracts of
adhesion. 148 According to one institutional leader in this area, the SAo
Paulo Ministgrio Pblico's consumer defense work in the late 1980s
and 1990s may be categorized into six broad themes: health, safety,
product quality and quantity, marketing, and abusive practices. 149 In
the area of health, prosecutors have mainly focused on the hygiene of
municipal slaughterhouses and drinking water quality. In the safety
area, prosecutorial work has concerned design defects in automobiles
and unsafe housing construction. In the area of product quality and
quantity, prosecutors have pursued manufacturers that adulterate their
products or misrepresent product quantity on their packaging.
Lawsuits concerned with marketing practices have been filed against
companies that engage in false advertising or advertise products that
are illegal to use. Finally, in the area of abusive practices,
prosecutorial attention has focused on the practices of health plans,
credit card companies, and private schools.
g. Disability Rights
In the area of disability rights, priorities of prosecutors included
the elimination of physical barriers to handicapped access in public
buildings and other public spaces; investigation of the extent to which
public schools provided programs for the disabled and, if necessary,
the filing of litigation seeking educational inclusiveness for the
148. See General Plan of Activities-2002, supra note 127.
149. See Filomeno, supra note 123, at 385-97.
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disabled; and legal measures to increase handicapped access to public
transport. 15 According to a SAo Paulo prosecutor active in this area,
public civil actions have been filed seeking to guarantee handicapped
access to all public and private schools and handicapped access to
public buses. 151 Conduct adjustment agreements have been negotiated
which require the provision of handicapped parking spaces in public
parking lots, the modification of sidewalks to include tactile
directional surfaces for the visually impaired, and the adaptation of
public playgrounds for disabled children.
CONCLUSION
To understand the success of group litigation in Brazil, one must
understand the institutional trajectory of the Ministirio Pliblico. The
group litigation work of the Ministgrio Pztblico has made the
Brazilian public civil action a dynamic and potent procedural
instrument. Its use and development cannot be disassociated from the
institution that bore and bred it without losing an understanding of
what has made it so successful and how it can serve as a model for
other civil law countries. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine the public
civil action being successfully transplanted to another civil law
country without a corresponding role for the Ministirio Pliblico of
that country. In other words, the model that Brazil presents does not
simply require a reform of civil procedure to allow the legal
representation of group interests. Rather, it requires fundamental
political and institutional changes that empower public prosecutors,
or perhaps another similar governmental institution, to act in the
name of society and hold other governmental actors accountable.
The Brazilian Ministrio Pztblico in many ways exceeded
Cappelletti's vision of what a Ministre Public could accomplish in
terms of representing and defending collective interests. Cappelletti
recognized the possibility that the Ministre Public might play this
150. See General Plan of Activities-2002, supra note 127.
151. See Email to author from Luiz Antonio Miguel Ferreira, Slo Paulo state prosecutor for disability
rights in Presidente Prudente (Feb. 7, 2008, 4:39 pm) (on file with author).
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role but concluded that the Ministre Public was too dependent on
the executive branch, too hierarchical, too removed from the people,
and too unspecialized to effectively represent collective and diffuse
interests.152  The Brazilian Ministrio Piblico, however, is
characterized by a very high degree of independence from the
executive branch and an absence of internal hierarchy that controls
the actions of individual prosecutors. Brazilian prosecutors developed
an institutional ideology that emphasized the active representation of
societal interests and the institution expended significant resources to
establish specialized prosecutorial positions and support systems for
specialized work. In a land where laws are infamous for remaining
"on paper" (ficar no papel), the Public Civil Action Law and the
substantive laws granting authority to the Ministgrio Ptiblico to
defend public interests have been used extensively.
While the Brazilian Ministrio Ptiblico illustrates the great
potential of this institution to develop a practice in public law
litigation, questions have been raised about appropriateness and
desirability of having a state institution advocate on behalf of the
public interest. Cappelletti raised the question of whether an
expanded role for Minist~re Public would go "hand in hand" with an
undesirable level of judicial activism. 153 Trubek expressed concern
that the Ministre Public would supplant legal advocacy by private
actors while not truly challenging the government on the most
important issues as it created the "appearance but not the reality of a
countervailing force."'1 54 Sarat raised the question of whether the state
would be able to tolerate and support a vigorous enforcement of
rights from within itself over time.
155
These concerns are being played out in Brazil. The Ministgrio
Pztblico's work has indeed been associated with a trend of the
judicialization of politics, and it has been charged with advocating
152. See Cappelletti, supra note 17, at 781-87; Cappelletti, supra note 23, at 525-26.
153. Cappelletti, supra note 17, at 808.
154. David Trubek, Public Advocacy: Administrative Government and the Representation of Diffuse
Interests, in ACCESS TO JUSTICE, VOL. III, supra note 13, at 490-93.
155. See Austin Sarat, Book Review: Access to Justice, Mauro Cappelletti, General Editor, Vols. I, 1,
III, and IV, 94 HARv. L. REV. 1911, 1917 (1981).
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vigorously on behalf of middle-class interests such as environmental
quality while ignoring lower class concerns such as agrarian reform
and racial equality.' 56 Perhaps most importantly, there have been
increasing challenges to the Ministgrio Pblico's group litigation by
the legislative and executive branches. 157 Proposed legal reforms
would reduce the Ministgrio Pztblico's powers to pursue the kinds of
public law litigation cases for which it has become well-known. The
future of the Brazilian Ministgrio Pztblico as an institution will
determine whether public law litigation in Brazil can be proffered as
a successful model for other civil law countries.
156. See Rog6rio Bastos Arantes, Constitutionalism, the Expansion of Justice and the Judicialization
of Politics in Brazil, in THE JUDICIALIZATION OF POLITICS IN LATIN AMERICA 231 (Rachel Sieder, Line
Schjolden & Alan Angell eds., 2005); Alvino Oliveira Sanches Filho, Instituif8es, cidadania e
movimentos sociais: o papel do Ministirio Priblico da Bahia, 182 CADERNOS DE CEAS 47-65 (1999).
157. Sadek & Cavalcanti, supra note 93, at 224-26.
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